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Abstract
In this paper, we draw on a phenomenological–philosophical foundation to clarify the
meaning of dignity as a coherent phenomenon. Consistent with an evocation of its central
meanings, we then introduce and delineate seven kinds of dignity that are intertwined and
interrelated. We illustrate how these kinds of dignity can provide a useful template to think
about its qualities, its ‘rupture’ and its ‘restoration’ in human life, particularly in relation to
health and social care contexts. We then consider the implications of these relational and
experiential views for current debates about the notion of dignity: Is dignity a useless
concept? Is dignity objective or subjective? What are the useful ways of characterizing
different varieties of dignity? We conclude by pointing to a metaphor that may hold the
sense and meaning of our deepest human dignity: The gathering of both value and vulner-
ability, in which human value does not depend on the eradication of human vulnerability,
but occurs within its very context.
Introduction
The term ‘dignity’ has many resonances in human life. People
refer to this term in multiple situations and also refer to multiple
variations of dignity’s absence. It is this variation of its use as a
term that has led scholars to question its philosophical, psycho-
logical and ethical value as a distinctive phenomenon. Although
we do not wish to support a philosophical ‘anything goes’
approach to dignity, we do want to be respectful to the complexity
of this phenomenon and how it is shaded in ways that reflect many
possible variations and nuances that human beings refer to in a
meaningful way. In other words, rather than question its existence
as a meaningful phenomenon, we wish to honour its complexity.
For us, many of the variations and lived resonances of dignity and
indignity appear to be referring to something that can be seen to
cohere as the essence of dignity. Although it is not fashionable to
pursue this line of thinking, we would like to show how a philo-
sophical clarification of the structure of dignity at its deepest
ontological level also offers the possibility for very practical direc-
tions for caring for ourselves and others in ways that are up to the
task of some of our deepest human intuitions.
This paper is directed towards a number of interrelated
concerns:
1 Drawing on a phenomenological–philosophical style of think-
ing, we attempt to clarify the meaning of dignity as a coherent
phenomenon.
2 We offer a framework that can show how this coherent phenom-
enon can be the source of multiple variations of ‘dignity’.
Although these variations are interlinked and overlapped, we find
it useful to name seven kinds of dignity, at least in relation to our
own disciplinary background in health and social care.
3 In beginning to consider the possible practical directions that
this framework may offer, we then focus on the ‘rupture’ and
‘restoration’ of human dignity with specific reference to health and
social care situations.
4 Finally, we offer a number of implications of our view of dignity
for current debates surrounding the integrity and nature of dignity.
We hope to show that a phenomenologically oriented analysis is
very useful to practice-related concerns in at least two ways:
Firstly, that it provides philosophical clarifications about the
essence of what this particular term in relation to health and social
care could mean within the vocabularies of communities in clinical
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practice and social care. Secondly, that it does so in a way that tries
to stay close to experiences that people can relate to in an everyday
way.1
A phenomenological–philosophical
approach
In the spirit of Husserl [1], we are interested in articulating the
quiddity or ‘whatness’ of dignity. Such a description involves an
articulation of the essence of dignity (its most invariant properties)
as well as its possible variations (kinds of dignity that are consist-
ent with its essence). And then, in the spirit of Heidegger’s phe-
nomenology [2], we wish to ground the human phenomenon of
dignity ontologically in Being. It is within this sensibility and
ontological view that we articulate the essential structure of
dignity as a relational phenomenon between Being and beings.
Within such an ontological perspective, dignity exists both ‘out
there’ as a relational situation as well as ‘in here’ as an experience;
dignity is then to be both experienced and to be considered within
relational situations (whether these relational situations are recog-
nized or not). Later, we will consider some of the implications of
this ontological view for the conventional debate of whether
dignity is subjective or objective. We also want to acknowledge
that in naming dignity as a phenomenon, we do so within a
Heideggerian understanding of the non-representational nature of
language. That is, we want our explication of dignity to be con-
sistent (its ontology), but without limiting the multiple ways it is
historically manifested in human and collective life (sometimes
referred to as the ‘ontic’ level). Thus different nuances of dignity
will be emphasized or de-emphasized in different individuals and
situations. The term ‘dignity’ then participates in both a unity of
meaning as well as its multiple resonances and meanings (such
variations are variations of the unity). Having briefly introduced
our phenomenological–philosophical approach, we now present
our description of the essence of dignity and its variations. Our
style of reflection has been guided by the work of Paul Tillich and
Rollo May, both existential philosophers. With reference to Tillich
[3], we considered how the phenomenon of dignity is distinctive
from or overlapping with his work on the phenomenon of ‘the
courage to be’. In meditating on the structure of dignity, we were
also influenced by the work of May [4] who understood something
of how the complexity of lived phenomena transcend either/or
categories.
Essential structure of dignity
Dignity is the affirmation of something valuable in oneself or
another as an ‘inheritor of Being’. Dignity is given by the ‘herit-
age’ of Being and as such, constitutes the deep value of what ‘I
am’. In ‘inheriting Being’, one carries the immensity of Being
within the limits of being human (embodiment, finitude, sociality
and so on). The deep source of self-valuing and other-valuing thus
lies in a certain consciousness of the intrinsic value of being per se.
Such valuing is also conscious of (although not necessarily the-
matically conscious of) a certain continuity between one’s own
being and the sharing of Being possibilities with others and things
as they have participated in the deep resonances of temporal being
and becoming. In this there is also the consciousness of (whether
thematized or not) a sense of the limits of being human with its
many vulnerabilities. Dignity thus lies in valuing this conjunction
of the limits of being human and the immensity of being. In more
metaphoric language we characterize this conjunction of immen-
sity and limits as ‘honour-wound’: The gathering of both value and
vulnerability, in which human value does not depend on the eradi-
cation of human vulnerability, but occurs within its very context.
‘Wound’, as a metaphor, is thus utilized in a poetic way to describe
both existential and literal vulnerabilities that come with the ter-
ritory of the limits of life. The ‘wound’ nuance resonates with
allied terms such as vulnerability, finitude, frailty, unprotected,
assailable, exposed, susceptible, limited.
The ‘honour’ nuance resonates with a number of other allied
terms: uprightness, worth, value, stature, recognition, salutariness,
self-standing. So dignity as ‘honour-wound’ thus holds vulnerabil-
ity together with great foundational value. This essential conjunc-
tion of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘value’ participates in all modes of
being-in-the-world whether it be an experience of self, or a per-
ception of others or situations, or an activity that occurs in relation.
You can imagine dignity as an experience in that one may have a
feeling of one’s own intrinsic worth; or as a perception of others,
one can imagine seeing someone else as dignified in their com-
portment or bearing. And then, you may imagine how one can
describe a situation as dignified or not. And again, one may
imagine forms of dignity that exist even though they are not
recognized by others. In all these forms of life, dignity can be
understood as real.
One of the implications of dignity as ‘the affirmation of some-
thing valuable in oneself or another as an inheritor of Being’, is
that such affirmation can be ruptured, or restored. Many of the
reasons why dignity has become such a topical discourse in public
life is because of the realization that dignity can be painfully
ruptured and in need of restoration. At this stage of explication, we
thus want to say something about the nature of rupture and the
nature of restoration. The rupture of dignity is constituted by a
devaluation of what ‘I am’, what others are, and what things or
situations are. Such modes of rupture or devaluation can occur
within a great range, from private self-judgement, to passive
neglect, to inhospitality, to ‘a slight’, to humiliation, to insult, to
violation. And it can be literally or existentially enacted; it has that
degree of range. The restoration of dignity refers to the recovery of
‘something valuable’ in what I am, or what others are, or what
situations and things are. Within the uniqueness of individual life
situations, the restoration of dignity requires different ranges of
response from private self-affirmation, to bearing witness, to
apology, to public or social reintegration, to repatriation, and to
reparative and reconciliative systems of justice. And we would like
to acknowledge that some degrees of rupture are very difficult, if
not impossible, to restore.
Having articulated something of the essence of dignity and its
ontological roots, we would now like to move to a consideration of
possible variations of dignity in human life. There are many ways
1 In pursuing these two concerns, we have concentrated most on the
philosophical definitional considerations. We are hopeful that readers can
recognize the connections between this philosophical level and the experi-
ential level. Given the space restrictions of this present paper, we ‘indicate’
rather than significantly ‘illustrate’ practice applications. There could be a
number of future papers that hopefully will proceed with further detailed
practical directions from this framework.
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that one can ‘cut the cake’ here, but we have found that it is very
useful to use lifeworld constituents as developed by Husserl [5],
Heidegger [2] Merleau-Ponty [6] and Boss [7]. In what follows we
name these lifeworld constituents and add some indications in
brackets, which although philosophically problematic2, may grant
the reader some experiential reference for these notions. These
lifeworld constituents refer to the following domains: spatiality (a
sense of place), embodiment (living as this body), temporality (a
sense of continuity), intersubjectivity (interpersonal relating),
mood (the ways the world can be qualitatively felt), identity (a
sense of self) and finitude (vulnerability).3 We are aware that
different phenomenologically oriented philosophers differ in their
opinion about some of these dimensions, for example, Heidegger
including ‘finitude’ and Merleau-Ponty including ‘identity’. But
we have found that all of these dimensions add value to the articu-
lation of differing emphases of dignity. So, informed by this
existential–phenomenological tradition and its family resem-
blances [10], we offer a view of human dignity that articulates a
certain unity to its essential features, but which also encompasses
a multiplicity of variations, or kinds and levels of intensity and
range. The seven ‘kinds’ of dignity are not intrinsically separate
categories, but exist in a seamless multidimensional way; that is,
they are all implicated in one another but with different relational
and experiential emphases.
We now demonstrate how this framework enables us to carry
forward the essential structure of dignity into a number of different
kinds of dignity. It is our view that the following seven kinds of
dignity form a useful template within which to think about the full
breadth of relational and experiential dignity, ruptured dignity and
restoration possibilities.
Kinds of dignity
Spatial dignity
There is a dignity experience and relationship that emphasizes a
sense of the dignity of one’s place in the world. When one’s place
in the world is bright, the person is tuned into how their own
identity is continuous with, and supported by, the depth and
breadth of their spatial environment. As human beings, a sense of
place and the ways that our places support us, appears to be
important for the kind of affirmation that is part of the mix that we
draw upon when valuing ourselves as an inheritor of being. In this
sense, Being is not just given by the temporality of history, but also
by the spatiality of place and environment – like the road that
winds out of a familiar town or the playground where my children
played. Such a sense of place can be both very personal and more
collective, and such attachment appears to be one of the central
variations of dignity: the dignity of being at home in my place.
Such spatial dignity may be different for different people, and
when such continuities are lost or taken away, a person may feel
this as an indignity that ruptures a sense of settled inheritance.
From a third-person perspective, seeing someone who is engaged
in their place of settled inheritance, one may notice a certain
fittingness and valued, un-preoccupied relationship between what
they are doing and the place that supports that – the place dignifies
their activities.
Temporal dignity
There is an experience of dignity that is attuned to one’s sense of
history and possibility, as well as to the present ongoing temporal
rhythms of night and day, of natural seasons, and of the phases of
one’s life. As human beings, in different ways, we value some
sense of historical heritage, whether this is cultural, ecological,
familial, occupational and so on; there is a sense of dignity ‘in the
feel’ of sensing support from these valued continuities. These
affirmations of continuity can be lost or taken, and can constitute
a challenge to the self-affirmation of Being. As human beings we
also value the many literal and metaphorical ways ‘we walk’
towards our meaningful projects and futures. There is a certain
kind of dignity that is connected with the felt competencies of ‘I
can’ that we either enact and affirm, or that are granted to us by
others and by life. In the rhythms of the present moment, there
appears to be a self-affirming value to a sense of ‘rightness’ in the
way that things unfold and move on; a musicality, if you will, to
temporal possibilities. Here, there is both a cyclical returning to
familiarity, as well as ‘the feeling of progress’ given by novelty and
the possibilities of life. Any disruption of this rhythm has potential
to undermine the dignity that a historical being can give. So, for
example, such ruptures to temporal dignity may include: being
disconnected from our heritage, being denied recognition of where
we came from or who we are, and a feeling of groundlessness and
discontinuity. From a third-person perspective, when temporal
dignity stands out, one may notice a certain temporal eloquence in
the rhythms of the ways people act and conduct themselves; like
the dignity of dancing.
Embodied dignity
There is a dignity experience that emphasizes a sense of one’s
bodily dignity. When one’s sense of bodily dignity is grounded,
the person is affirming the value of their carnal nature. There is a
sense that their own body is somehow connecting them with all
their embodied heritage and bodily connections to earth and the
historical continuity of embodied being-in-the-world. It announces
2 Although we can derive the lifeworld constituents (such as spatiality,
temporality and so on) directly from Heidegger [2,8], it would be inaccu-
rate and remiss to fail to reference the original source of these constituents
from Husserl [1] (see already Ideas 1, part 2, Chapter 1).We wish to also
acknowledge Merleau-Ponty [6] who utilized and modified the emphasis
of these constituents (including ‘Identity’ as worthy of special considera-
tion apart from ‘Intersubjectivity’). In some circumstances, and for differ-
ent philosophical purposes, it may be important to focus on the distinctions
between these thinkers, and in other circumstances, to acknowledge their
family resemblances. The purpose of this present paper was not one that
needs to pursue the different ways in which Husserl and Heidegger under-
stood ‘intersubjectivity’, for example. Rather, for our purposes here, the
most generic naming of these basic constituents (called ‘existentiale’ by
Heidegger) provide us with ‘orienting generalizations’ and name useful
experiential domains that are productive when considering a phenomeno-
logically oriented framework for dignity. We could offer interesting dis-
cussion about why Husserl did not name ‘mood’ as a primary constituent
and why Heidegger did not name ‘identity’ as separate from ‘sociality’, but
this is a separate consideration that is tangential to the trajectory of the
present paper.
3 For brief concrete examples of the descriptive value of these constituents,
see [9], Chapter 2. Such examples illustrate ways of describing peoples’
experiences of clinical situations from a first person perspective as an
alternative to medical third-person perspectives.
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both the privacy of one’s bodily life as well as a public face that
announces ones bodily participation in a world with others. A
sense of bodily dignity gives us the bodily ‘I can’ and the bodily ‘I
am’; in this we have a lived sense of the potentials of competent
bodily functioning, which is intrinsic to a sense of bodily worthi-
ness. Experientially the body ‘screams out’ in painful awareness
when one’s bodily privacy is invaded, or when one’s bodily pres-
ence in the face of others is shamed. When we see another who
carries themselves with embodied dignity, we may notice a com-
portment in which the person carries or bears both a sign of
self-accepted vulnerability and a certain honour in this; the body in
dignity pre-reflectively knows itself as ‘honour-wound’.
Interpersonal dignity
There is a dignity experience that emphasizes a sense of one’s
interpersonal value and worthiness. When this sense of interper-
sonal valuing is bright, one is participating in an interpersonal
world of mutuality in which we gift one another as intrinsically
‘mattering’ to one another, and within community, in mutual ways.
When human beings fall from the possibility of mutual intrinsic
valuing, we can easily assail dignity. This mutual valuing is not a
passive, effortless given; rather, it is something that requires an
attentiveness and some guarding. The need for this kind of atten-
tiveness and guarding of interpersonal dignity arises because the
vulnerability that comes with being participates in the ambiguities
of darkness and light, harmony and strife, where we love and
destroy each other. An experiential sense of interpersonal dignity
thus appears to carry a certain ‘common humanity’ in the ways we
attend to one another’s existential vulnerabilities. When interper-
sonal dignity is present in this way, one may notice a certain
respectful character in the way social relations are regarded and
conducted. This is not to deny, however, that there are some stand-
ards of dignity in different social/cultural situations that may be
unjust and even harmful to others. Thus these standards of inter-
personal dignity are always open to moral contestability and other
considerations of justice and humanity. So, although this dimen-
sion or emphasis of interpersonal dignity can be misused and
perverted, its deep reality balances an appreciation of human vul-
nerability with value; and as such, leans towards the deepest appre-
ciation of our common humanity.
Mood dignity
Mood is a fundamental characteristic of any experiential moment.
Dignity can be carried in many moods; in solemn sadness, cel-
ebratory joy, poignant love, defiant determination and simple
‘here-I-am peacefulness’. So, if dignity is not just one mood,
should we then articulate dignity without recourse to a mood
dimension and define it only relationally? We do not think so.
There appears to be a common ‘feel’ to dignity that threads
through all these different moods. This felt thread through all the
mood variations mentioned earlier, such as solemn sadness and so
on, is one that straddles the complexity of both ‘felt vulnerability’
as well as that of ‘felt value’. This is the complex mood of ‘honour-
wound’, the felt aspect of valuing Being because of its vulnerabil-
ity rather than in spite of its vulnerability. Honour-wound – a
certain feel of ‘upholding-in-vulnerability’, a felt knowing and a
showing of this. From a third-person perspective, when the mood
of dignity is noticed, one may see a number of variations as
indicated earlier; however, there is a certain awareness that the
other is valuing Being in this way.
Identity dignity
As human beings, we appear to carry a coherent and deep sense of
everything that is gathered for us, how things are for us, spatially,
bodily, temporally, in mood. This ‘self-gathering’ is core to our
sense of identity and has deep implications for dignity. So, there is
a dignity emphasis that refers to this gathered deep self-identity,
and this can be affirmed, lost or stripped away at different levels.
When a sense of the dignity of identity is challenged, one is faced
with a rupture or threat to the ‘something valuable in or as
oneself’, and a need for restoration is acutely felt. Such rupture can
often be felt pre-reflectively as an immediate threat to the coher-
ence and value of one’s identity, whether personal or social. Many
of our experiences of everyday dignity refer to an experience of
one’s own identity that meets our personal standards of self-value
of a particular kind. As a corollary, we may experience an every-
day indignity when we experience ourselves as feeling less than
our personal standard of a particular kind. This can be very simple
and personal, such as when one walks into a room realizing that
one is underdressed or overdressed for the dignity required of a
particular situation. We want to emphasize that the nature of this
personal standard in relation to dignity is not necessarily a moral
standard (although it can be), but more centrally a standard about
our perception of what is ‘fitting’ for ourselves to be. These vari-
ations are many, and although very personal (and subjective), also
participate in collective and cultural contexts. Thus, certain groups
have particular nuances regarding certain standards that other
groups may not understand (or which may be difficult to condone,
such as the highly shocking standards that make use of dignity as
a rationale for honour killings). From a third-person perspective,
when identity dignity stands out, one may notice in different ways
how an individual or group may be deeply attached to their stand-
ard for what is valuable regarding self-value or group-value. So,
for example, when a particular occupational group, usually unno-
ticed in the background are given recognition in a public way for
their contribution, a certain dignity identity is given to the
members of that occupation. In dignity, identity is honoured.
Finitude dignity
There is a dignity experience that is particularly attuned to the
potential of our existence to ‘not be’: the potential of personal
death. Such an attunement gives dignity its poignant face, the
delicate beauty of its vulnerable affirmation in spite of potential
non-being. This fragile affirmation of the value of being is sober-
ing, but in a way that gives being its preciousness. On the down-
side, we may wish to run away (take flight) from this beautiful
soberness by turning away from each other in various ways, thus
leaving one another existentially alone (as in examples of death
denial). On the upside, when this dimension of vulnerability is
personally accepted to some degree or interpersonally affirmed,
there is a certain ‘standing out’ ‘with’ vulnerability that feels
worthwhile and meaningful. In such moments one may feel emo-
tionally moved by the, ‘this is how it is’, worthwhileness of human
existence in spite of it all; the dignity of embracing life’s limits.
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Intensity and range of indignities:
possibilities for restoration
All these previous kinds of dignities can be ruptured at various
levels of intensity and range. By ‘levels of intensity’ we mean how
deeply the rupture of dignity occurs, as well as how difficult it is to
restore such rupture. Thus, intensity refers to rupture and restora-
tion. Further, the range of indignities refers to how many of the
above dimensions of dignity are implicated if dignity is ruptured.
Based on this notion of intensity and range, we would like to
propose that it is useful to conceptualize three levels or degrees of
intensity derived from a consideration of how easily dignity is
established, ruptured or taken away. Such intensity is also derived
from a consideration of how easy or difficult it is to restore.4 So,
for example, within the spatial-dignity emphasis, one’s connection
to place can be violently ruptured, or alternatively, can be mildly
interfered within a way that can be easily restored. But the rupture
can also occur, for example, not only in the spatial dimension, but
in a way that implicates more and more of the other dimensions
such as temporality, identity and so on. Therefore, in deep indig-
nity, there is both a depth of intensity and a breadth of range. There
is a very practical reason as to why we wish to delineate the range
and intensity of indignities, and this concerns pointing to practical
directions for care. Practical ways to restore dignity then needs to
appropriately meet both the intensity of the indignity as well as the
range of dimensions that are implicated in any indignities: this is
what it would take to restore dignity. So for example, if in a
situation of interpersonal indignity a person’s sense of inner iden-
tity has also been ruptured, one would need to be sensitive to the
fact that just restoring the interpersonal situation may not have the
range needed to also restore the inner identity-indignity that the
person is now carrying. In other words, beyond the interpersonal
situation, there is now also an ‘inner wound’ that carries further
into new situations that may not look undignified from a third-
person perspective. This way of thinking about the rupture of both
intensity and range of indignity can act as a sensitizing framework
to help attune professionals to the potential threats to dignity for
people in our care.
Consistent with our analysis of the essence of dignity, the ‘res-
toration’ of dignity is the restoration of a certain sense, given by
Being’, of the ‘something valuable in what I am’, that comes from
one’s heritage. Here we mean ‘heritage’ in the deepest ontological
sense of being-in-the-world, but also a ‘heritage’, which includes
the existential kinds of dignity already named, and which include
cultural belonging, sense of place, and the shared humanity given
by finitude. The restoration of ‘something valuable in what I am
and what others are’ thus involves finding, re-finding or
re-membering one’s ‘goodness of fit’ or harmony with these
dimensions.
Having articulated the ‘bare bones’ of our relational and experi-
ential view of dignity, its essence, variations, possible ruptures and
restoration, we would like to now consider the implications of this
phenomenological–philosophical view for current debates sur-
rounding the notion of dignity.
Implications for current debates
We believe that our approach to naming and delineating the
essence of dignity and its variations can make a contribution to
three specific debates within the philosophical and professional
literature.
Dignity as a ‘useless concept’
The notion of human dignity has been, historically, a highly con-
tested idea bound up with very different stances in value and
application [12]. Pinker [13] worried about use of dignity to
support a conservative agenda that discourages forms of medical
innovation such as genetic manipulation. Pinker was following
Macklin [14] who also questioned whether dignity as a concept
was necessary, and recommended that we replace dignity with the
principle of personal autonomy. Macklin argued that dignity adds
nothing. Pinker [13] goes further than this as he is concerned that,
not only is dignity a useless concept, but that it can be colonized by
a religiously inspired agenda that co-opted the notion of dignity to
justify what he calls ‘an obstructionist bioethics in relation to
medical progress’. He refers specifically to the President’s Council
on bioethics as an example, where the notion of dignity can, in his
view, be harmful and used to pressurize and pervert public agendas
and the progress of a free society. So, within a concern to empha-
size democracy and individualism, one can see that ‘autonomy’
has become an attractive alternative for such thinkers.
Another suggested alternative to the concept of dignity occurs in
the work of Statman [15]. Philosophically, he problematizes the
concept of dignity, and focuses on the concrete problem of
humiliation as the preferred context from which ‘dignity’ is the
proposed solution. In his view, when considering the context of
humiliation, ‘self-respect’ is sufficient as a pragmatic concept, one
that does not seek recourse to the more philosophically vague
notion of dignity. According to Statman [15], within this context,
we do not need the vaguely descriptive notion of dignity, as the
normative notion of self -respect is a sufficient response to the
problem of humiliation.
Using a similar line of argument within a health care context,
Wainwright and Gallagher [16], believe that an appeal to the
concept of respect is more important for nursing than an appeal to
dignity. In other words, they do not believe that an understanding
of what dignity is has much import for practice. And there are
other thinkers who provide further alternatives to dignity beyond
the notions of autonomy and self-respect. Shotton and Seedhouse
[11] progress an argument within the context of healthcare ethics
and consider what it means practically to care about peoples’
rights to be valued as persons.
So given these arguments, is the notion of dignity a useless
concept, in that, at best it alludes to a vague impractical notion, and
at worst supports a conservative agenda? Our phenomenological
articulation of the essence and variations of dignity provides a
perspective in which dignity has a centrally important reason for
being: it opens up a lived perception of a deep common humanity
in which we participate in both vulnerability as well as honourable
kinship. The philosophical grounding of this perception has a very
practical normative possibility in that it points to the meaningful
source of the ability to care, to respect, and to grant autonomy and
beneficence to others. In other words, it provides the possibility of
4 Here we are indebted to Shotton and Seedhouse, [11] who follow a
similar kind of analysis in their work to develop practical directions.
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a living basic intuition or perception that is deeper, that ‘gives
juice’ or lived authenticity to respectful caring behaviours which
could otherwise easily become instrumental without such
perceptual-intuitive sustenance. So our claim is that alternative
concepts to dignity such as respect, autonomy, beneficence are
given their meaningful life by the ontologically prior notion of
dignity as honour-wound; and this is not just a concept, rather it is
a phenomenon that calls.
Dignity as objective or subjective?
The question about whether dignity is objective or subjective
occurs within a much larger philosophical heritage that is some-
times referred to as the debate between realism and idealism [17].
Recent thinking however has generally moved beyond this Carte-
sian dualistic split, but this ‘habit of thinking’ does not lie down
easily. Such thinking still encroaches into debates about whether
dignity is really ‘out there’ or whether, being only psychological,
is whatever we construct it to be. For example, a new way of
re-importing the subjective/objective split can be seen in
Statman’s [15] arguments. Statman [15] acknowledges certain
objective features of dignity in a descriptive way as referring to
something that ‘belongs to all members of the human species
irrespective of their rationale or their moral capacities and irre-
spective of the exercise of these capacities’ (p.525). He uses this
objective account of dignity to refer to a level of universality that
is so abstract that all it can say is that all human beings are entitled
to dignity. Therefore dignity as an objective phenomenon can be
raised as a meaningful principle, but it has no meaningful appli-
cation in the real world of particulars, and as such, is deemed to be
unhelpful in everyday life. On the other hand, Pinker’s [13] argu-
ment is an example of the possibility that dignity exists as a
subjective phenomenon. Such subjectivity is highly relative to
cultural and individual context and he contends that its only value
is to encourage a greater attentiveness to situations where respect
and autonomy are required. The approach of Shotton and
Seedhouse [11] is also consistent with an approach that empha-
sizes the subjectivity of dignity. They link what is usually called
dignity to the subjective experience of feeling capable to achieve
what one would normally achieve. They thus emphasize a sense of
personal agency based on relative individual and social standards.
To quote them, ‘. . . this analysis suggests that dignity always has
to do with being in a position in which one is capable’ (p. 249). Our
phenomenological articulation of the essence and variations of
dignity does not make hard and fast distinctions between objective
and subjective dignity, yet wishes to acknowledge the terms of the
debate in a different way: Instead of objective and subjective, we
talk of relational and experiential. In other words, dignity as a
relational phenomenon acknowledges that there is something out
there, which we can call dignity, that can be viewed from both a
second- and third-person perspective, and whose meanings thread
through all its variations. And dignity as an experiential phenom-
enon acknowledges multiple individual, cultural and social vari-
ations of dignity, and thus can be a highly personal experience. In
accounting for relational and experiential dimensions of dignity,
the phenomenologically oriented ontology on which our analysis
is based also indicates the complementarity of the ‘relational’ and
the ‘experiential’. However, within the traditional discourse of
objective and subjective, the ‘objective’ is usually seen as an alter-
native to the ‘subjective’ (as in: it’s ‘only subjective’). Within a
phenomenologically orientated ontology, relational and experien-
tial dimensions of dignity are seen as co-constituting one another
or are seen as necessary implications of one another as in ‘figure
and ground’. Thus dignity as ‘honour-wound’ is relational in that it
connects this highly unique individual beyond themselves to the
essential source of dignity given by the self-standing of Being.
And dignity as ‘honour-wound’ is also uniquely experiential in
that such possibility of self-standing with both vulnerability and
honour can be experienced in highly unique ways, even according
to highly unique standards. So our contribution to what is called
the subjective/objective debate involves a ‘reframe’, which moves
the terms of the debate from a conflict model to a complementary
model. Therefore, dignity is neither objective nor subjective in
itself, but is both a relational state of affairs as well as uniquely
experiential.
While we may not refer to dignity often in everyday life, we
know it when we see it, and we identify with it when it is assailed.
One example of this relational and experiential state of affairs is
given by Lingis [18]. He eloquently describes that what we see and
call dignity, is noticed more clearly and honoured in the poignancy
of death. Here dignity is not an intentional seeking, rather it is
manifest through an endurance of a time (one’s death bed) without
any future. In this situation, one of no future, the person is facing
nothingness, their projects cease, the past can no longer offer its
resources and the person ‘awaits what cannot be foreseen or con-
fronted’ p.268. Here Lingis [18] is acutely and sensitively attuned
to how dignity is ontologically announced in this marginal situa-
tion; how dignity can come through a kind of letting-be in the face
of everything falling away. Our approach overlaps with Lingis in
that, he is pointing to what makes dignity ontologically possible in
a very radical way. And by using dying as an example, he is
powerfully articulating a ‘bearing witness’ to honour-wound.
Here, honour-wound is both a relational state of affairs as well as
a felt experience.
Variation in naming kinds of dignity
In this section we focus on some attempts by scholars and
researchers to delineate different kinds of dignity. We have chosen
these papers because they raise some fundamental issues about
naming kinds of dignity that we believe can be fruitfully addressed
by our ‘honour-wound’ articulation of dignity.
Statman [15] provides an example of a conceptual clarification
that divides dignity into two notions: the descriptive and the nor-
mative. For him, dignity at a descriptive level of analysis is so
abstract as a principle that it appears to have no discriminating
value in everyday practical life. He separates this descriptive
account from a normative account, which does have discriminating
value and use in everyday practical life. Within this normative
account of dignity, dignity refers to ‘. . . obligations incumbent on
oneself or on others with regard to oneself’ [15, p. 525]. He
essentially argues in a nuanced way that it is only the normative
account of dignity that has any useful value in human discourse
because it is at this level that judgements can be brought to bear
about whether situations are dignified or humiliating. But even
then when he looks in a rigorous way at what is going on when
these norms are appealed to, he asserts that the concept of respect
is sufficient as an explanatory concept and that one needs no
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recourse to a vague concept like dignity. So the word dignity can
be eradicated in normative analyses (replaced with the term
respect) and the descriptive analysis of dignity has no meaningful
relation to this. This is an ontology that separates the descriptive
from the normative. In other words, it does not see a connection to
how the normative is grounded in, and given life by, its descriptive
depth and breadth. Our ‘honour-wound’ approach sees an intimate
connection between what Statman [15] calls the descriptive and
normative levels of analysis. For us, the more ontological (descrip-
tive) articulation of dignity as the ‘affirmation of something valu-
able in oneself and others as an inheritor of Being’ is a crucial
intuition or perception that has great import for the way that we
define a number of kinds of dignity with their normative possibil-
ities for everyday life. So for us, ontic variations and kinds of
dignity cannot be separated from the essence of dignity (its onto-
logical level). And that is why we cannot reduce a number
of different kinds of dignity to the notion of this one kind, that of
‘respect’. Given our ontological description of the essence of
dignity, and referring to the kinds of dignity that we have articu-
lated, we find a number of ways in which self-affirmation occurs
that is not simply encompassed by the singular notion of self-
respect (e.g. dignity in space, dignity in temporal rhythm etc.). The
interdependence of our ontological–ontic approach, thus, retains
the value of defining dignity as dignity essentially, while also
indicating the complexity of its multiple variations, which still
retain this essential quality of dignity as dignity.
Shotton and Seedhouse [11] are further examples of scholars
who are concerned about the ‘vagueness’ of the way the concept
of dignity is used. They take this concern towards a practice-
related direction by considering situations of indignity and how
such kinds and levels of indignity affect one’s psychological
experience of agency and competence. In other words, in taking
this practical lens, they consider situations in which a human
being fails to achieve what they would normally achieve and be
capable of. To quote them ‘. . . dignity always has to do with
being in a position in which one is capable’ [11, p.249]. There is
merit in the way they focus on agency and how they derive dif-
ferent levels and intensities of dignity loss. However, from our
point of view, in emphasizing agency and competence (becom-
ing), they de-emphasize the kinds of dignity that are associated
with belonging, heritage and connection (Being). In other words
they have a dignity of ‘I can’, but not a dignity of ‘I am’. There-
fore their ‘kinds and levels of dignity’ is limited to these pos-
sibilities of competence and agency. And this also determines the
range of restoration possibilities that they recommend. Drawing
on our ‘honour-wound’ approach to kinds and levels of dignity,
indignity and restoration, we would say that Shotton and
Seedhouse have forged a welcome step forward in that they have
opened up the agency-related forms of dignity with some inter-
esting practical directions. However, our approach complements
these kinds and levels with those that tap into a deeper existential
level that is not necessarily agency-related (being, belonging,
etc.), and this opens up possibilities for restoration of dignity at
this Being level where a larger ontological identity can be experi-
enced as part of the possible givenness of Being.
So far, in considering variations in naming kinds of dignity, we
have pointed to thinkers or scholars who, in our view, practice a
kind of partiality in principle in the way they define the boundaries
of dignity. And by implication, the practical directions that they
take would be restricted by these definitional interests, for
example, autonomy, competency, agency. We now wish to con-
sider a few other contributors to this debate that enact a different
kind of partiality, a partiality about the range of dignity and indig-
nity possibilities that are derived from a focus on a particular
patient group or clinical context or where empirical data takes
primacy in deriving a typology of dignity. In other words, the
following contributors do not restrict the definition of dignity at a
philosophical level, but rather restrict it at an enacted level because
of necessary disciplinary preoccupations.
Nordenfeldt [19], derives varieties of dignity from his
empirical research programme that includes the dignity of
‘Menschenwürde’ (intrinsic dignity), dignity as merit, dignity of
moral stature, dignity of personal identity. These varieties overlap
substantially with what we see in our own approach at both the
ontological and ontic levels. However, Nordenfeldt notes that his
development of the kinds of dignity he articulates were largely
derived from empirical research he carried out with colleagues
and this is perhaps why he did not have as full a spectrum of the
kinds of dignities that we have offered through deriving these
philosophically.
Likewise, Leget [20], who also displays a wide philosophical
range informed by Ricoeur [21], provides a framework that
includes subjective dignity, social and relational dignity, and
intrinsic dignity. In focusing on the implications of this for end-
of-life care, Leget [20] opens up a depth of focus that provides
practically relevant insights for caring interactions in such circum-
stances. The advantage of focusing on the pragmatics of this pro-
fessional context is that it provides detail and depth to specific
stories of dignity, rupture and restoration. A limitation of this
analysis is that it puts aside the definitional issues too early to
focus on the practical issues, and this constitutes a partiality of
breadth; breadth is necessarily sacrificed for depth. Other contribu-
tors [22–26] provide examples of research studies that name the
characteristics of dignity through empirical exploration or
metasynthesis of the literature in nursing. These professional con-
texts include, for example, paediatric care, rehabilitative care and
dementia care. Again, a depth of insight in these specific practice
contexts emerge in relation to particular nuances of dignity and
indignity, such as feelings of shame, challenges to autonomy and
self-management. For example, Delmar [26] was able to highlight
that an overemphasis on autonomy can obscure patients’ need for
help and in turn negatively impact their sense of dignity. But in our
view, these empirical studies and professional concerns that gen-
erate depth and detail would best be complemented by a wider
context of definitional breadth. And this is what we believe our
philosophical analysis offers: a framework of seven dimensions
that could be usefully considered within any research project or
professional context. For example, when considering the dignity of
a loved one with Alzheimer’s disease, the framework would not
just focus on interpersonal dignity, but would wonder also about
spatial dignity and allow consideration of how to help a person feel
dignified in place and so on.
We hope that we have indicated some benefits of our ‘honour-
wound’ approach to dignity for current debates: dignity is not a
useless concept, dignity is both objective and subjective; and the
seven kinds of dignity provide philosophical range and breadth for
both studies and practice contexts in relation to dignity, its rupture
and its restoration.
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Conclusion
We would like to end this contribution by making a move that is
consistent with an aesthetic emphasis within the phenomenologi-
cal tradition [8,9,27–29]. This direction at times employs more
evocative language in order to facilitate ‘embodied relational
understanding’ [30], a kind of knowing that may be more up to the
task of ‘keeping alive’ the sense and presence of a phenomenon.
The use of poetic and metaphoric language can thus be seen to
express existential realities that people can relate to in a personal
way: ‘Poetic language with regard to experience is “truthful” in
that it attempts to retain the prereflective qualities of experiential
structures – concrete, embodied, mooded, sensed, interrelated, and
always full of the imagination gathered from other times and
places. In poetic discourse, one’s relatedness to existence is
revealed in that it asks the listener to move towards the speaker or
the text and to find the body of the occasion, its taste or mood in his
or her own’ [31, p. 12].
So we invite you to participate for a moment in the following
partial pointers.
Dignity is a holding and an upholding – a gathering of both
common ‘wound’ (vulnerability) and common honour (value). It
is an upholding of honour while holding wound; such gatherings,
whether individual, interpersonal or communal also give us clues
as to its restoration. The loss of dignity is especially noticed in
its rupture. Its path of loss is through vulnerability. Its path of
restoration is through honour and value. We are given to bear and
uphold the vulnerable values of ‘being ourselves’ in place,
rhythm, with others, heritage, body, being-affirming moods and
life – many kinds of dignities – but all cohering in their ‘honour-
wound’ character – our ‘goodness of fit’ with all of these
dimensions.
And here are some lines from the poem, Wild Geese by Mary
Oliver [32] evoking both common vulnerability and great value-
in-being (ecologically and more):
. . . Whoever you are, no matter how lonely,
the world offers itself to your imagination,
calls to you like the wild geese, harsh and exciting. . . .
Over and over announcing your place
in the family of things. (p. 14)
Further, Leonard Cohen [33] also evokes vulnerability and great
value in his poem/song, Here It Is.
And here you are hurried
And here you are gone
And here is the love
That it’s all built upon. (p. 199)
And we conclude with an image of our own.
She stands in tatters. They cut off her hair. This was not her choice
and she shuffles along in hunger. Rupture. But where does the
glow in her eyes come from when she meets your gaze? More than
defiance: Dignity. Here it is. All the way down. Honour-wound.
References
1. Husserl, E. (1998/1913) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book (trans F. Kersten),
London, UK: Kluwer Academic Publication.
2. Heidegger, M. (1927/1962) Being and Time (trans J. Macquarrie & E.
Robinson), Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
3. Tillich, P. (2000) The Courage to Be, 2nd Revised edn. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
4. May, R. (1969) Love and Will. New York, NY: Norton.
5. Husserl, E. (1936/1970) The Crisis of the European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenologi-
cal Philosophy (trans D. Carr), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press.
6. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962) Phenomenology of Perception (trans
C. Smith), London, UK: Routledge.
7. Boss, M. (1979) Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology
(trans S. Conway & A. Cleaves), New York, NY: Jason Aronson.
8. Heidegger, M. (2001) Zollikan Seminars (ed. M. Boss, trans F. Mayr
& R. Askay), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
9. Galvin, K. T. & Todres, L. (2013) Caring and Well-Being: A Lifeworld
Approach. London: Routledge.
10. Moran, D. (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology. London, UK:
Routledge.
11. Shotton, L. & Seedhouse, D. (1998) Practical dignity in caring.
Nursing Ethics, 5 (3), 246–255.
12. Bayertz, K. (ed.) (1996) Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
13. Pinker, S. (2008) The stupidity of dignity. New Republic May 28th
2008. Available at: http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/
The%20Stupidity%20of%20Dignity.htm (last accessed 14 October
2014).
14. Macklin, R. (2003) Dignity is a useless concept. British Medical
Journal, 327, 1419–1420.
15. Statman, D. (2000) Humiliation, dignity and self-respect. Philosophi-
cal Psychology, 13 (4), 523–540.
16. Wainwright, P. & Gallagher, A. (2008) On different types of dignity in
nursing care: a critique of Nordenfelt. Nursing Philosophy: An Inter-
national Journal for Healthcare Professionals, 9, 46–54.
17. Bernstein, R. J. (1988) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
Hermeneutics and Practice. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsyl-
vania Press.
18. Lingis, A. (2010) Dignity. The Humanistic Psychologist, 38, 267–
268.
19. Nordenfeldt, L. (2004) The varieties of dignity. Health Care Analysis,
12 (2), 69–81.
20. Leget, C. (2013) Analysing dignity: a perspective from the ethics of
care. Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy, 16, 945–952.
21. Ricoeur, P. (1992) Oneself as Another. London: University of Chicago
Press.
22. Lundqvist, A. & Nilstun, T. (2007) Human dignity in paediatrics: the
effects of health care. Nursing Ethics, 14 (2), 215–228.
23. Lohne, V., Aasgaard, A., Caspari, S., Slettebø, A. & Nadin, D. (2010)
The lonely battle for dignity: individuals struggling with multiple
sclerosis. Nursing Ethics, 17 (3), 301–311.
24. Tranvåg, O., Peterson, K. A. & Nåden, D. (2013) Dignity-preserving
dementia care: a metasynthesis. Nursing Ethics, 20(8), 861–880.
25. Delmar, C., Alenius-Karlsson, N. & Højer Mikkelsen, A. (2011) The
implications of autonomy: viewed in the light of efforts to uphold
patients dignity and integrity. International Journal of Qualitative
Studies on Health and Well-Being, 6, 6045.
26. Delmar, C. (2013) The interplay between autonomy and dignity: sum-
marizing patients voices. Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy, 16,
975–981.
27. Gendlin, E. T. (1997) The responsive order: a new empiricism. Man
and World, 30, 383–411.
28. Van Manen, M. (1990) Researching Lived Experience: Human
Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy. Ontario: The Althouse
Press.
29. Heidegger, M. (1971) Poetry, Language and Thought (trans A.
Hofstadter), New York, NY: Harper & Row.
K. Galvin and L. Todres The meaning of dignity
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 417
30. Todres, L. (2008) Being with that: the relevance of embodied under-
standing for practice. Qualitative Health Research, 18 (11), 1566–
1573.
31. Todres, L. (2007) Embodied Enquiry: Phenomenological Touchstones
for Research, Psychotherapy and Spirituality. Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan.
32. Oliver, M. (1994) Dream Work. New York, NY: Grove/Atlantic Press.
33. Cohen, L. (2006) Book of Longing. New York: McClelland and
Stewart.
The meaning of dignity K. Galvin and L. Todres
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.418
